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The United States, as the world superpower, must commit to all necessary action to prevent acts of genocide across the globe. As the world's superpower, the United States has a mandate to preserve and protect innocent life from brutality at the hands of mass murderers unstopped by a failing state's ineffective government. Genocide can be prevented, if the US is sincerely committed to the effort.

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
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
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Executive Summary

Title: US Intervention with Genocide: Case Study of Rwanda Genocide

Author: Major David A. Johnson, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The prevention of genocide is achievable, with a committed United States leading the effort. The U.S. must embrace the reality that a failure to responsibly intervene when genocide conditions surface does not absolve it from future intervention. Rather, a failure to prevent genocide almost certainly guarantees future involvement, after millions of innocent lives are lost.

Discussion: In the course of a hundred days in 1994 the Hutu government of Rwanda and its extremist allies virtually succeeded in exterminating the country's Tutsi minority. It was the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century. The Rwanda genocide was a carefully planned campaign to rid the country of the Tutsis, thus ensuring Hutu rule and influence for the foreseeable future. The warning signs were early, evident and pointed to an increasing unstable situation capable of sliding into genocide.

The United States understood the conditions in Rwanda prior to and during the genocide, but the United States officials decided against taking a leading role in confronting the slaughter in Rwanda. Rather, US officials confined themselves to public statements, diplomatic overtures, and initiatives for a ceasefire. The US did use its influence, however, at the United Nations, but did so to discourage a UN response. In wake of mounting evidence and international media coverage, the US finally launched substantial operations in July 1994, in a supporting role—to assist humanitarian relief efforts for those displaced by the genocide. In retrospect, if the US responsibly intervened early, the horrific outcome could have been altered. In future scenarios, the US must lead and bring all national elements of power to bear to prevent genocide.

Conclusion: The United States, as the world superpower, must commit to all necessary action to prevent acts of genocide across the globe. As the world's superpower, the United States has a mandate to preserve and protect innocent life from brutality at the hands of mass murderers unstopped by a failing state's ineffective government. Genocide can be prevented, if the US is sincerely committed to the effort.


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
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
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Rwanda before the Genocide

The country border is shown in white. Dense forest areas surrounding the Parc National des Volcans and the Forêt de Nyungwe appear green in the image, north and south of Lake Kivu, respectively.



Rwanda After the Genocide

This is a 1995 Landsat TM mosaic for the country of Rwanda after the genocide. The national border is shown in white. Genocide sites: Mass Graves ("lieux publics") are shown in blue, Memorials ("lieux de culte") in red, and resistance sites ("collines de résistance") in green

Chronology

August 1993: Following months of negotiations, Habyarimana and the RPF sign a peace accord that allows for the return of refugees and a coalition Hutu-RPF government. 2,500 U.N. troops are deployed in Kigali to oversee the implementation of the accord.

Sept.1993-Mar.1994: President Habyarimana stalls on setting up of power-sharing government. Training of militias intensifies. Extremist radio station, Radio Mille Collines, begins broadcasting exhortations to attack the Tutsis. Human rights groups warn the international community of impending calamity.

March 1994: Many Rwandan human rights activists evacuate their families from Kigali believing massacres are imminent.

April 6, 1994: President Habyarimana and the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, are killed when Habyarimana's plane is shot down near Kigali Airport. Extremists, suspecting that the president is finally about to implement the Arusha Peace Accords, are believed to be behind the attack. That night the killing begins.

April 7, 1994: The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the interahamwe set up roadblocks and go from house to house killing Tutsis and moderate Hutu politicians. Thousands die on the first day. U.N. forces stand by while the slaughter goes on. They are forbidden to intervene, as this would breach their "monitoring" mandate.

April 8, 1994: The RPF launches a major offensive to end the genocide and rescue 600 of its troops surrounded in Kigali. The troops had been based in the city as part of the Arusha Accords.

April 21, 1994: The U.N. cuts its forces from 2,500 to 250 following the murder of ten Belgian soldiers assigned to guard the moderate Hutu prime minister, Agathe Uwiliyingimana. The prime minister is killed and the Belgians are disarmed, tortured, and shot and hacked to death. They had been told not to resist violently by the U.N. force commander, as this would have breached their mandate.

April 30, 1994: The U.N. Security Council spends eight hours discussing the Rwandan crisis. The resolution condemning the killing omits the word "genocide." Had the term been used, the U.N. would have been legally obliged to act to "prevent and punish" the perpetrators. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of refugees flee into Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. In one day 250,000 Rwandans, mainly Hutus fleeing the advance of the RPF, cross the border into Tanzania.

May 17, 1994: As the slaughter of the Tutsis continues the U.N. agrees to send 6,800 troops and policemen to Rwanda with powers to defend civilians. A Security Council resolution says "acts of genocide may have been committed." Deployment of the mainly

African U.N. forces is delayed because of arguments over who will pay the bill and provide the equipment. The United States argues with the U.N. over the cost of providing heavy armoured vehicles for the peacekeeping forces.

June 22, 1994: With still no sign of U.N. deployment, the Security Council authorizes the deployment of French forces in south-west Rwanda. They create a "safe area" in territory controlled by the government. Killings of Tutsis continue in the safe area. The United States government eventually uses the word "genocide."

July 1994: The RPF captures Kigali. The Hutu government flees to Zaire, followed by a tide of refugees. The French end their mission and are replaced by Ethiopian U.N. troops. The RPF sets up an interim government of national unity in Kigali. A cholera epidemic sweeps the refugee camps in Zaire, killing thousands. Meanwhile the killing of Tutsis continues in refugee camps.

August 1994: New Rwandan government agrees to trials before an international tribunal established by the U.N. Security Council.

November 1994: U.N. Security Council establishes an international tribunal that will oversee prosecution of suspects involved in genocide.

Jan. 5-10 1995: U.N. begins process towards finalizing plans with Zaire and Tanzania that will lead to the return of one and a half million Hutus to Rwanda over the next five months. U.N. Security Council refuses to dispatch an international force to police refugee camps.

Feb. 19, 1995: Western governments, including the U.S. (\$60 million), pledge \$600 million in aid to Rwanda.

Feb. 27, 1995: U.N. Security Council urges all states to arrest people suspected of involvement in the Rwandan genocide.

Mid-May 1995: Tensions increase between the United Nations and the Rwandan government; the government growing resentful of the lack of international financial aid.

June 10, 1995: U.N. Security Council unanimously agrees to cut by more than half the number of U.N. troops in Rwanda after a direct request from the Rwandan government to withdraw U.N. forces.

August 1995: U.N. Security Council lifts arms embargo until September 1, 1996.

Dec. 12, 1995: United Nations Tribunal for Rwanda announces first indictments against eight suspects; charges them with genocide and crimes against humanity.

Dec. 13, 1995: U.N. Security Council extends its peacekeeping mission for three more months and agrees to reduce the number of troops.

Nov. 1996: Mass repatriation from Zaire begins; the Rwandan government orders a moratorium on arrests of suspected genocide perpetrators.

December 1996: Trials begin for Hutus involved in 1994 genocide.

Mid-Dec. 1996: Tanzania closes refugee camps and repatriates Rwandans, bringing the total to over one million.

January 10, 1997: First case in the Rwandan genocide trials comes before the International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. The case is against Jean Paul Akayesu, a local government official accused of ordering mass killings in his area.

January 17, 1997: In a Rwanda court, Francois Bizimutima becomes the third person convicted and sentenced to death for his role in genocide.

January 13-17, 1997: A woman who testified against Jean Paul Akayesu is murdered along with her husband and seven children by Hutu extremists.

January 22, 1997: Over 300 are killed in an attempt by the Rwandan army to capture Hutu insurgents responsible for killings in Northwestern Rwanda, including the murder of the three Spanish aid workers. U.N. officials state many victims are recently returned refugees who witnessed the 1994 genocide and are potential trial witnesses.

February 2, 1997: In Gikongoro, Rwanda, Venuste Niyonzima is the first man tried locally for crimes against humanity in his own village. A U.N. Human Rights official in Rwanda expresses "serious concern" over the lack of lawyers and adequate defense for those accused of participation in the 1994 genocide. Canadian priest, Guy Pinard, a witness to the 1994 genocide, is murdered by Hutu terrorists while saying mass.

February 4, 1997: Five human rights observers are killed in an ambush in Cyangugu, Rwanda. The murders are viewed as an effort by Hutu terrorists to get foreign observers out of the country. All human rights observers in Cyangugu, Kibuye, and Gisenyi are withdrawn by the U.N. to Kigali.

February 14, 1997: United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan asks the five permanent security council members to look into reports that the Zairean army is providing arms to Rwandan Hutus in an Eastern Zaire refugee camp.

February 14, 1997: Frodouald Karamina, leader of a Hutu extremist political movement, is sentenced to death for his involvement in the genocide. Karamira is believed to be one of the leaders and organizers of the genocide, having coined the slogan "Hutu Power" and made many racist radio broadcasts urging mass murder. Karamira expressed no remorse for the part he had played in the genocide. Karamira was born a Tutsi and assimilated himself as a Hutu only later in life.

February 19-20, 1997: Four prominent Rwandans accused of genocide appear in court for the first time.

February 23, 1997: Israel Nemeyimana is the first defendant in the genocide trials to be found not guilty. Authorities state there was a lack of evidence and witnesses.

February 26, 1997: Citing mismanagement and inefficiency, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan fires the chief administrator Andronico Adede, and deputy prosecutor Honore Rakoromoanana in the Rwanda criminal trials. Agwu Okali of Nigeria is appointed new chief minister. By this date, the court has indicted 21 suspects.

February 28, 1997: Virginia Mukankusi is sentenced to death for her participation in the genocide.

December 1999: A leader of a Hutu militia that helped lead the genocide, businessman Georges Rutaganda, is found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity, and sentenced to life in prison. He is the sixth person found guilty since the ICTR began hearings in Arusha, Tanzania.

SOURCE: Rwanda Development Gateway: www.rwandagateway.org/rubrique.

Preface

The Rwanda genocide has become a synonym for one of the worst genocides of the 20th century. An estimated 800,000 lives were lost in a 100 day struggle for life. A systematic plan to murder and eradicate a group was able to unfold in April 1994. The event went virtually unchecked by the international community, until media coverage began to recognize the scale of slaughter. The situation in Rwanda was never viewed as consequential, until images of bodies floating down rivers were broadcasted around the globe. Only then did the U.S. and UN begin to take the situation seriously, but by then it was too late.

The following essay is a result of the author's genuine desire to comprehend why the United States failed to intervene in Rwanda. I sought to learn how the genocide was calculated, endorsed and carried out, and if the United States could have prevented the event. Through my research, I discovered the U.S. was acutely aware of the situation, but choose not to intervene. And the U.S. as the world superpower can prevent genocide, but must fully commit to the effort. All elements of national power must be applied with a matched political will.

This thesis would not have been possible without my mentor Dr. Pauletta Otis. I am grateful to Dr. Otis for her patience, guidance and expertise. Her mentorship and support was instrumental to the completion of this dissertation.

"A destruction that only man can provoke, only man can prevent."

Elie Wiesel

Introduction:

The United States, as the world superpower, must commit to all necessary action to prevent acts of genocide across the globe. As the world's superpower, the United States has a mandate to preserve and protect innocent life from brutality at the hands of mass murderers unstopped by a failing state's ineffective government. Within the National Security Strategy, it is stated that the U.S. "must not allow debate over genocide to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not prepared for peace."ⁱ This strategic posture recognizes that if the United States fails to act and genocide results, the resulting failed state destabilizes the affected region, eventually demanding U.S. attention and commitment. *The prevention of genocide is achievable, with a committed United States leading the effort.* The U.S. must embrace the reality that a failure to responsibly intervene when genocide conditions surface does not absolve it from future intervention. Rather, a failure to prevent genocide almost certainly guarantees future involvement, after millions of innocent lives are lost.

A fundamental challenge for American leaders is to persuade others—in the U.S. government, across the United States, and around the world—that preventing genocide is more than just a humanitarian objective it is a global mutual interest. "Where genocide occurs in our world, we must accept our moral obligation as ethical human beings within the world community of nations to prevent, suppress and punish this crime against all humanity."ⁱⁱ An effective prevention policy; resides with the U.S. taking the lead. The U.S. must construct a process with triggers that provides early warning, detailed

prevention planning, and engagement with the international community. The “United States has many tools at its disposal, a wide range of options between the extremes of doing nothing and sending in the Marines. To prevent genocide, the U.S. government must draw on a wide array of analytical, diplomatic, economic, legal, and military instruments and engage a variety of partners”.ⁱⁱⁱ

This paper will examine and use the 1994 Rwanda genocide as a case study to illustrate and verify genocide is preventable. The collected research will reveal genocide can be checked and offers constructive ideas to enable leaders to prevent future genocide acts. The paper is organized to provide a backdrop with an event timeline, to give historical context followed by subsequent chapters focusing on leveraging U.S. national power to influence crippling nations and irresponsible leaders to ensure genocide does not materialize.

The paper represents a roadmap for leaders to utilize and employ will lead to effective warning, prevention and if necessary military measures planned around a rational political objective geared towards prevention. The first line of operation – early warning considers measures and efforts that should be considered prior to the actual event. This step if enacted early and done correctly will yield considerable benefits; as it promote actions geared to preventing the enablers of genocide. The next line of operation – prevention, describes how the U.S. can more effectively partner with international nations to stop nation leaders’ intent on committing genocide. This step is critical to fostering global will to act and requires the United States to actively engage the United Nations and host nation. Finally, the last line of operation – military intervention, looks at the United States capacity and capabilities to provide a military force capable of

forcibly entry as a last resort to halt genocide. The force must originate from the United States; the United Nations force models are inadequate to handle this challenge. A United Nations force will not provide the host nation with a well trained and equipped unit. The United States can provide a host of force models to deal with nations struggling with genocide intentions.

In the 1994, Rwanda presented the world with a serious moral dilemma. The crux of the dilemma rested with real sovereignty issues coupled with a less than enthusiastic United States and international community unwillingness to intervene because Rwanda was not viewed as a strategic interest. The lack of U.S. leadership in this case, helped generate an apathetic global environment incapable of effective, timely intervention or response. The U.S. did fail to act “the United States did not advocate a response to the genocide, nor did the U.S. mission to the United Nations under orders from the Secretary of State.”^{iv} Ultimately in a complete calculation of the Rwanda genocide, it is evident prevention was possible, but the United States in concert with the international community failed to properly mobilize and intervene in Rwanda.

Opponents of intervention contend any force mandated to enforce peace without the country's approval would violate sovereignty and contribute more chaos not order. It's also suggested intervention is too time consuming to organize and the costs associated compel nations to not participate. In retrospect, these counter arguments encompass no merit because the responsibility to protect the innocent and preserve humanity defeat all arguments. The argument should rest and end in the human right realm – that appreciates the sanctity of human life. The consequences of the 100 day Rwanda massacre persist to be felt today. It left the country in ruins, scrambling for survivors,

justice, and reconciliation. And almost 14 years later, Rwanda finds itself unable to recognize complete justice and accountability, precluding Rwanda from fully realizing national resolution.

Chapter I Backdrop:

In April 1994, a planned systematical plot to massacre life was implemented in the county of Rwanda producing one of the world's worst genocidal incidents in history. The origins behind the Rwanda genocide are distinguished by a variety of corrosive influences that eventually collided and created an unmistakable violent and sadistic 100 day struggle of life and death.

The Rwanda genocide claimed "between 800,000 to a million lives in the 100 days from April 1994 to July 1994."^v It seemed the genocide in Rwanda was an alarming testimony to the ineptness of the United States (US) and United Nations (UN) and collective leaders of the international community.

This was not the first case, where the global community failed to act and tolerate genocide to occur. Far too often, waiting is the chosen methodology; because actual confirmation of genocidal acts is required before action is considered. The failure "to respond to the Rwandan genocide, especially during May and June of 1994, when sufficient evidence confirmed that genocide was taking place, demonstrated the inability of the international community to marshal the will to intervene."^{vi} Expert knowledge "of present conditions and educated analysis of those pertaining to the near-future is essential to any decision maker, and the failure to acquire that knowledge in Rwanda directly contributed to the genocide. Again, decision makers cannot solve a problem without timely, relevant and accurate information."^{vii}

For the past 50 years, genocides in Iraq, Cambodia, Pakistan, and Serbia transpired while the United States and international community sat on the sidelines voicing their displeasure. The intense and passionate rhetoric called for accountability but produced modest action “the debate was intense and very bitter, and the twentieth century ended with it utterly unresolved in the UN or anywhere else.”^{viii} In each case, genocide flourished amidst inflamed conditions and allowed mass atrocities to transpire.

In the fall of 1993, the UN established the UNAMIR mission commanded by Canadian General Romeo Dallaire to Rwanda to oversee the Arusha peace accords and the end of a four year civil strife between the Tutsi and Hutu. A settlement on “August 4th 1993 was reached in 1993 in Arusha that carried peace provisions for the future broad based transitional government, a united armed forces”^{ix} and many other issues to including a cease hostilities pay reparations to refugees. The accords also recommended a neutral international force be positioned to support the implementation. As a consequence of the agreement, a UN reconnaissance team deployed to Rwanda and returned several weeks later with their findings. After review of the report, it was decided the UN would create a peace keeping force. By way of a Security Council resolution in October 1993, established the UNAMIR mission and authorized the deployment for six months. This provides the genesis behind the UNAMIR mission and explains why the UN unit was in country prior to the genocide in 1994.

The UNAMIR flag was raised on November 1st 1993 in the northern town of Kinyhiria. From the onset, the unit was tested due to multitude of restraints. A juxtaposition of forces from Belgium, Ghanaian and Bangladeshi made up the 2,500 man unit; this made interoperability difficult due to different doctrines, languages and equipment. The force had minimal logistical support, to include shortages of “fuel,

ammunition, sandbags and barbed wire.”^x And the unit lacked key essential personnel to include humanitarian and human rights experts. And to further constrain the mission, the mandate fell under Chapter VI of the UN charter, which requires “shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”^{xi} The UN Security Council can approve supportive actions when both parties have failed to resolve their disputes but does not permit the use of force. The mission of the peacekeepers was to monitor the security of the city of Kigali, monitor the ceasefire and assist with the formation of the new army.

The deteriorating peace conditions in Rwanda were not confusing or murky. Past ethnic tension, political disputes and intelligence reports of a plot to erase the Tutsi was brought to the attention of the UNAMIR commander. On January 10th 1994, a “senior figure in the radical *interahamwe* militia approached the UN forces and articulated that the Hutu leadership ordered him to draw up plans for the extermination of the Tutsis.”^{xii} The actual fax sent from General Dallarie to the UN is below.

On January 5th 1994, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana was sworn in as President of Rwanda. This had been agreed by the parties during the Arusha peace agreements. It was also anticipated the “transitional national assembly would be in place, but the parties were unable to reconcile on representation.”^{xiii} From this point forward,

the "security conditions in Rwanda began to seriously deteriorate."^{xiv}

JAN 11 1994

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994 *NR 57*

TO: BARIL/DPKO/UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLARIE/UNAMIR/KIGALI
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE-212-943-4552 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT	
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2	

1. FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFORMANT BY VERY VERY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POLITICIAN. INFORMANT IS A TOP LEVEL TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERHAMWE-ARMED MILITIA OF MRND.
2. HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATURDAY'S DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH AIMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMING TO CEREMONIES AND BELGIAN SOLDIERS. THEY HOPED TO PROVOKE THE RPF BN TO ENGAGE (BEING FIRED UPON) THE DEMONSTRATORS AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEPUTIES WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLIAMENT. BELGIAN TROOPS WERE TO BE PROVOKED AND IF BELGIANS SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER OF THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS GUARANTEE BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA.
3. INFORMANT CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERS OF THE GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES. ALSO AT LEAST ONE MINISTER OF THE MRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALI WERE IN THE DEMONSTRATION. RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.
4. INFORMANT IS A FORMER SECURITY MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO STATED HE IS PAID \$150,000 PER MONTH BY THE MRND PARTY TO TRAIN INTERHAMWE. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND PRESIDENT OF THE MRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.
5. INTERHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEN IN RGF MILITARY CAMPS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. THE 1700 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40 THROUGHOUT KIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOYED HE HAS TRAINED 300 PERSONNEL IN THREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT RGF CAMPS. TRAINING

Upon learning of the intelligence gathered and the ever changing conditions on the ground, the UNAMIR commander reached back to his chain of command in New York to inform and gain guidance. General Dallarie, "sent cable in January 1994 to the UN department of Peacekeeping Operations, headed by Kofi Annan, of the plan of extremist Hutu to exterminate Tutsi."^{xv} But the warnings were largely ignored by the UN. His requests were opposed by New York and his force remained constrained because their chapter IV mandate constricted the unit's ability to enforce security. The General's pleas to revise the mandate and collect more forces were rejected. The Hutu extremists were betting the UN did not maintain the fortitude to test their resolve and their calculation proved to be correct.

The assessments fell on deaf ears and generated only modest UN and international interest and the situation remained a low priority although credible evidence was produced to show otherwise. The warnings although communicated failed to impact the

political process back in New York, only after the incident exploded and became completely out of hand did international concern begin to surface.

The UN and the international community understood the situation in Rwanda far before the genocide exploded. And when the situation became evident due to events, the response was delayed and wholly insufficient. Below is a except taken from a cable memorandum from Prudence Bushnell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, through Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "Death of Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali", April 6, 1994.

If, as it appears, both Presidents have been killed, there is a strong likelihood that widespread violence could break out in either or both countries, particularly if it is confirmed that the plane was shot down. Our strategy is to appeal for

U.S. & U.N. disinterest and indecision was a byproduct of their inability to ascertain the potential of the situation and, therefore, did not consider Rwanda a vital interest that warranted further time, energy or support. The slaughter in Rwanda was not a spontaneous clash between the two ethnic groups; the killings were planned long before the spring of 1994. The exact time when the plot was conceived may never be discovered, but for genocide to occur, "a group of people must make an agreement that constitutes conspiracy."^{xvi} The genocide was premeditated and organized to murder the Tutsi population. The Hutu extremists did not value nor see the Tutsi as human beings, rather the devaluation of life coupled with searing ethnic tensions between the two groups created an ever hostile environment filled with rage and hatred. Philip Gourevitch, a journalist when he wrote his account of the genocide in Rwanda, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, notes "like the Nazis, who believed in the creation of an Aryan utopia which necessitated the destruction of the Jewish

people, the Hutu-led government of Rwanda imagined that by exterminating the Tutsi people they could create a better world.” This aspect of the conflict is in part why the genocide plan was allowed to be premeditated and rationally carried almost immediately after the president was killed. Within 45 minutes of the crash, “roadblocks were established and towns and houses were being searched.”^{xvii}

On April 6th 1994, Hutu extremists inside Rwanda launched a massive operation after the Rwanda president died while flying back from a summit in Dar- es – Salaam. The plane was shot down which facilitated the genocide by igniting panic, fear and uncertainty. The unambiguous operational design to eradicate the Tutsi group was now in motion. The plan triggered by the president’s death made the plan less difficult to execute because uncertainty and fear prevailed in the country. It was a “rational choice, dictated by the logic of survival: either we kill them first or else we will be killed.”^{xviii} The call for the termination of the Tutsi began and was motivated by Hutu desire to re-establish dominance and govern without Tutsi influence.

(S) Almost immediately after President Habyarimana was killed, in Kigali the Presidential Guard began the systematic execution of prominent Tutsi and moderate Hutus sympathetic to reconciliation. Multiple sources indicate that the violence by the Presidential Guard and various youth militias was not spontaneous, but was directed by high-level officials within the interim government. It appears that, in addition to the random massacres of Tutsis by Hutu militias and individuals, there is an organized, parallel effort of genocide being implemented by the army to destroy the leadership of the Tutsi community. The original intent was to kill only the political elite supporting reconciliation; however, the government lost control of the militias, and the massacre spread like wildfire. It continues to rage out of control.

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Intervention Dilemma

Efforts by the U.S and international organizations to prevent and punish genocide are hindered by a fundamental tension that exists within international relations: that between sovereignty and responsibility. On one hand, as a matter of international law, practice relating to the principle of state sovereignty and diplomatic practice, all states are entitled to a high degree of autonomy in governing their domestic affairs. This includes managing the relationships between their governments, citizens and between the various groups in society. Inherent in this entitlement, is the right for a country to be free from external interference in all matters. In the new world order, which links the corners of the globe through economic channels, it's necessary for all states to have an interest in ensuring governments adhere to basic values of governance, including the protection of their population's security and wellbeing. To avoid one state's disruptive internal matters, may prove to be devastating to another's economic prosperity and could lead to either state or regional instability

The Westphalia treaty signed in 1648, created a climate "and belief that a state's border is inviolate."^{xx} By creating a modern system of nation-states, the internal affairs of a sovereign state became revered. The principle of sovereignty holds that states are not subject to the authority of any higher institution or principle and that the state itself is the ultimate source of political authority within its territory. Following this basic principle of international organization, international law and diplomatic practice are clearly biased in favor of state independence in matters that are considered to be domestic. At the most basic level, sovereignty implies freedom from unsolicited peripheral interference. This provides a measure of stability, certainty and order for several centuries.

An encouraging development concerning state sovereignty has emerged in wake of recent genocide acts enacted during the 1990s. The establishment of several international tribunal courts to deal with genocide in Rwanda and Yugoslavia has chipped away at sovereignty because the international community is realizing sovereignty does not trump human rights. A direct result of committed ethnic violence and genocide has persuaded the international members to “advocate a responsibility to protect that purports a government is responsible for protecting its own citizens against human rights infractions, but if it fails to do so the international community has the right to protect those in danger.”^{xxi} The rational evolution to contemplate intervention is immeasurable because “the international community once held out action until the event was properly categorized genocide before they took action to ameliorate the problem.”^{xxii}

The debate will persist, but movement is hopeful and serves as caution to state leaders who once never feared intervention, to now contemplate the possibility. Unfortunately, several years after mass killings in Rwanda, the United States is still searching for a broad policy to address deadly public conflicts. Among Washington policymakers, only two basic principles have achieved some consensus. “First, U.S. ground troops generally should not be used in humanitarian interventions during ongoing civil wars. Second, an exception should be made for cases of genocide, especially where intervention can succeed. Support for intervention to stop genocide is voiced across most of the political spectrum.”^{xxiii}

US Leadership

To prevent genocide, the U.S President and U.S. Congress must lead the international body to support prevention and intervention. Presidential leadership is critical during any international crisis. President Clinton engulfed with pressing domestic issues, and the

Somalia debacle only six months old, was not eager to commit resources to intervene. This inaction clearly contributed to the Rwanda calamity never receiving the attention it warranted. Appreciation of the grave situation in Rwanda was never realized by the U.S. government. Expert knowledge “of present conditions and educated analysis of those pertaining to the near-future is essential to any decision maker, and the failure to acquire that knowledge in Rwanda directly contributed to the genocide. Again, decision makers cannot solve a problem without timely, relevant and accurate information.”^{xxiv}

The President possesses a multitude of policy and military options but President Clinton never “throughout the one hundred days of genocide inquired of possible U.S. responses and never asked his National Security Advisor to call a meeting to discuss the issue.”^{xxv} Even though the American public view genocide as a national priority, “by more than three-to-one (69%-21%), the public believes the U.S. and other Western powers have a moral obligation to prevent one group of people from committing genocide against another group.”^{xxvi}

The U.S. government does not have a coherent policy for preventing genocide. The ad hoc manner in which the United States has handled past genocidal crises reflects a lack of priority placed on the issue. Clear presidential priority is needed and is the single most reliable way to enhance genocide prevention awareness throughout the U.S. government

Key Events:

In April 1994, President Habyarima’s plane was shot down, igniting the Hutu Power radio stations to direct Hutu radical to indiscriminately kill all Tutsis. This culminating order that catalyzed the Rwanda genocide was significantly fuelled in

October 1993 when Interahamwe (a Hutu Power militia) controlled radio stations broadcasted anti-Tutsi and anti-RPF messages outlining the inherent differences between Hutu and Tutsi, the foreign origin of Tutsi, the disproportionate share of Tutsi wealth and power, and the horrors of past Tutsi rule. The Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines broadcasts (RTLHC) repeatedly stressed the need to be alert to Tutsi plots and possible attacks and called upon Hutu to prepare to defend against the Tutsi. After the assassination of President Habyarima, the message shifted from propaganda to directed killings, specifically in areas where the killings initially were resisted. The radio in Rwanda was used to incite and mobilize, then to give specific directions for carrying out the killings “the RTLHC broadcast such things as you have missed some of the enemies in this or that place, you must go back and finish them.” xxvii

On April 8 1994, General Dallaire sent word to United Nations headquarters in New York, Dallaire informing the UN that the campaign of violence was organized, deliberate and conducted primarily by the presidential guard. UN forces are not allowed to intervene in combat activities unless genocide is occurring. In response, Lt. General Dallaire is instructed to focus UN forces only on evacuation of foreign nationals from Rwanda. Dallaire asks for, but does not receive, more soldiers. The Security Council votes to reduce “UN soldiers to withdrawal the 260 man force on April 27, 1994.” xxviii

In May 17 1994, the UN conceded that “acts of genocide may have been committed.” It is estimated that 500,000 Rwandans had been killed by this point. The genocide ends in July 1994, when the RPF, a Tutsi led rebel faction, pushed the Hutu radicals and their interim government out of the country.

Chapter II: Early Warning Indicators of Possible Genocide

Heightened awareness of early warning indicators of possible genocide is essential to successful prevention. At the most basic level, early warning requires precise information be readily circulated to policymakers to influence action. Although awareness of early warning indicators alone does not guarantee future prevention, failure to recognize that indicators exist almost certainly does. Furthermore, early notice must not consist of a snapshot of an event in motion. An early warning that recognizes and describes the environment *correctly* will allow U.S. policy makers to judge the *right* policy response. "In a sense, the system worked: Diplomats, intelligence agencies, defense and military officials--even aid workers--provided timely information up the chain to President Clinton and his top advisors. That the Clinton Administration decided against intervention at any level was not for lack of knowledge of what was happening in Rwanda." - William Ferroggiaro, National Security Archive Fellow

An effective monitoring mechanism that looks at risk areas would have proved to be useful in 1994. It's inconceivable for the U.S to watch the entire globe; rather a refined list of risk areas capable of enacting genocide is required. Any form of early warning to assist with effective prevention, "starts with identifying those situations that have the potential to generate mass atrocity crimes."^{xxix} An understanding that each genocidal event is unique with distinctive characteristics forces a comprehensive understanding of all factors at work.

Knowledge of "on the ground conditions" to include local dynamics is central to recognition. Correct recognition will lend to effective warning which would allow for detailed and prescriptive measures designed to mitigate vice inflame the situation. Given

the information overload that senior official's experience, simply adding to their already overflowing inboxes with more information on potential threats is not a convincing solution. Meanwhile, policymakers are likely to be grappling with many other pressing issues and priorities—the more so at successive levels of seniority. Thus, for early warning to be effective, the response to warning must be built on a mechanism that connects analysis to possible policy options. And the warning product is of little value unless it is linked to credible action.

U.S. embassies, USAID missions, and U.S. armed forces deployed around the globe represent the front lines of U.S. foreign policy, generating large amounts of information that could be relevant to preventing genocide and mass atrocities. The State Department and USAID employ roughly 6,600 and 1,000 Foreign Service officers (FSOs), respectively, and the U.S. military has troops forward-deployed worldwide. Although early warning of genocide and mass atrocities is mainly the territory of the intelligence community and diplomats, all of these U.S. personnel can be valuable sources of information and should be leveraged in future situations.

While it is impossible to anticipate exactly when and where the next genocide may occur, it is relatively easy to identify countries at risk. Virtually “all instances of genocide or mass atrocities since World War II occurred coincident with or closely following a major internal conflict or the taking of power by more radical or more harshly authoritarian leaders.”^{xxx} Other conditions associated with elevated risk of genocide and mass atrocities include history of genocide, autocracy, state-led discrimination, and high infant mortality. It is worth underscoring little support exists for the conventional wisdom suggesting that religious or ethnic diversity in itself poses risks for genocide or mass atrocities. Below is a list of know risk factors that breeds genocide.

- Armed conflict
- Leadership instability
- State-led discrimination
- Nonviolent protest
- History of genocide/mass atrocities
- High infant mortality
- Exclusionary ideology
- Ethnically polarized elite
- Autocratic regime

Source: Drawn from Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust?

Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955.” American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 57-73, and subsequent analysis of mass killing by the PITF.

Its evident information was disseminated to senior U.S. policy makers. But the information did not coerce policymakers to take action. The information was lacking substance. Most “U.S. officials opposed to American involvement in Rwanda were firmly convinced that they were doing all they could—and, most important, all they *should*—in light of competing American interests and a highly circumscribed understanding of what was “possible” for the United States to do.”^{xxxix} And when General Dallaire battled by phone with the United Nations in New York, to inform them of his intelligence gained by “an inside informant, the UN told him plainly and consistently that the United States in particular would not support aggressive peacekeeping. A request by the Belgians for reinforcements was also turned down. In Washington, Dallaire's alarm was discounted. Lieutenant Colonel Tony Marley, the U.S. military liaison to the Arusha process, respected Dallaire but knew he was operating in Africa for the first time.”^{xxxii} A few public statements proved to be virtually the only strategy that Washington would muster in the weeks ahead.

Detailed country specific information coupled with detailed analytical evidence gained by respected authorities will help yield better products to persuade policy makers to make educated time sensitive decisions to prevent. The Rwanda genocide generated so much unchecked energy that the notion of prevention was inconceivable in 1994. Intervention was possible as late as the first week of April, but prevention was now off the table of possible options. Atrocities are often carried out in places that are not commonly visited, where outside expertise is limited, where country-specific knowledge is lacking.

All action was reactive vice proactive, which proved to be deadly advantageous for the perpetrators. The U.S and UN were not convincingly warned of the chaotic “on the ground” atmosphere, thereby assisting in creating a pervasive and tolerate environment that permitted the growth of genocide.

The “United States should continue to support the development of regional early warning systems at the AU and African sub regional organizations and push to incorporate specific attention to genocide and mass atrocities.”^{xxxiii} The advent of a new Combatant Command in Africa showcases a new mechanism that can be leveraged in the future to provide enhanced intelligence and coordinated in Africa. A holocaustic well coordinated warning system aimed to spell out symptoms in recognized risk areas will make possible U.S. leaders to make better informed decisions concerning a specific region capable of committing genocide. The new combatant command focused on the continent of Africa is an encouraging sign promoting U.S. involvement.

Chapter III: Prevention

Prevention in the form of humanitarian assistance is often argued as too expensive, and encourages no international interest or action. Nations do not want to allocate resources to resolve a problem that may not affect their way of life. But a look at the Rwanda genocide discounts this argument “a UN peace enforcement operation in Rwanda was estimated to cost nearly 100 million, whereas, international assistance to Rwanda from April 1994 to December 1995 was over 2 billion.”^{xxxiv} In retrospect, the cost to help rebuild Rwanda clearly overshadows the cost to preserve a peace enforcement force.

The promise of genocide prevention requires significant commitment but as noted before the cost of prevention is more cost effective than costs to repair a society from genocide. To successfully prevent genocide or mass atrocities, the “U.S government will need to increase resources, boost capacities, and exercise leadership to make prevention a priority, because we cannot be certain where the next genocide will take place, the United States must be prepared to engage effectively in many complex situations simultaneously.”^{xxxv}

An effective prevention approach requires: “(1) an understanding of the conditions and triggers that lead to and enable the mass atrocities, (2) the means required to mitigate those conditions, and (3) a concerted strategy to apply those means.”^{xxxvi}

Essentially, an early recognition warning coupled with will to marshal necessary political will to apply resources to deliver the appropriate response. So how an emerging conflict is construed is paramount to marshalling action. If the analysis is done correctly without regard to more perceived pressing domestic or international political issues, the analysis will enable policy makers to recognize the event and its potential for harm, thus hopefully aid in marshalling political will to take steps.

Like most crimes, genocide requires a mix of incentive and means. To interrupt this thread is critical to attaining prevention. A targeted prevention strategy focusing on three avenues – leaders, civic societies and institutions, is where we can begin to realize prevention as plausible. Focused energy in these areas, requires comprehension that no model exists to ensure the prevention of genocide, but that direct support in these areas will accumulate capacity to check potential genocides.

Leaders who believe they can gain from genocide will likely pursue genocidal acts. Thus, reducing capacity for a leader to do harm to its citizens is fundamental to any prevention prescription. Therefore, U.S. leadership must be able to constrictively influence leaders from these methods by promoting direct diplomacy, economic aid and or advertising sanctions can be influential tools to sway a leader to act responsible.

For genocide to occur, weapons and funds must be amassed to perpetrate the crime. This entails a network to facilitate the movement, purchase and eventual dissemination to the perpetrators. Therefore, in risk areas, identification of movement these resources is critical to ascertaining emerging genocide intentions.

In Rwanda, significant arms were collected prior and leading up to 1994. From 1991 to 1992, “France sent more than 6 million worth of mortars, light artillery, armored cars and helicopters, and in 1993, Rwanda increased their imports dramatically.”^{xxxvii} Additional imports from China flooded Rwanda between 1992 and 1994 to include “581,000 machetes and hundreds of thousands of axes, hoes and maize cutters to companies not usually concerned with agriculture goods.”^{xxxviii} And during this period the “army saw its forces rise from 3,000 to 40,000 between 1990 and 1992.”^{xxxix} These influxes of arms were not viewed by “U.S diplomats as suspicious or alarming, rather their focus remained on the success of the peace process.”^{xl} The peace process coupled

with a civil war did not enable the policy makers on the ground to ascertain the growing speed at which genocide was being planned. The flow of arms only supported the civil war argument and with the peace process in motion, diplomats and policy makers accepted it as defensive purposes. As Deputy Chief of Mission Joyce Leader explained “did these bits and pieces add up to a concerted strategy to exterminate Tutsi- if it did, we did not see it at the time.”^{xli}

The U.S government was informed of the Rwanda situation, but never fully appreciated the unique dynamics in Rwanda. Thus, forecast of the inevitable was implausible due to the immature knowledge of the region and concern of certain obligation amongst other priorities that appeared more vital. By more “than three-to-one (69%-21%), the public believes the U.S. and other Western powers have a moral obligation to prevent one group of people from committing genocide against another group.”^{xlii}

Risk Areas

Steering risk adverse regions from conflict to accountability is a key component to genocide prevention. Democratic principles and distribution of power must be equitable and transparent to facilitate rule of law. Often, in conflict torn areas capable of genocide, is a common thread -the alliance of inequitable power and government misrule. Unequal distribution of power, wealth and influence allows misrule to exist and thrive. The more representation a government is, the likelihood of accountability to exist is much higher. And although, any form of democratic government is preferred, a fundamental to emphasis is the use of checks and balances to curb executive abuse. This along with balanced distribution of resources and power along the local and national levels will ensure minorities are not ostracized and political segregation is reduced.

Since genocide is frequently a strategy that “ruling elites use to resolve real solidarity and legitimacy conflicts or challenges to their interests”^{”xliii} because often unchecked ruling classes through their misrule exclude minorities or ethnic groups which over time contests order, persuades the elite to rationalize and employ genocide as a permissible means to maintain power. Democratic states, “even unstable states which have been democratic for more than five years or more, did not commit genocide.”^{”xliv} Therefore, the practice of free elections and equal representation in governance will enable new actors to emerge and narrow exclusion of minorities. Focus on more transparency and “transformative steps such as eliminating ethnic registration cards, and distinctive regional signs labeling groups and instituting political parties to open up alternatives once dominated by others will foster more inclusion and less resentment.”^{”xlv}

Fundamental to a functional responsible society is solid small groups or civic societies engaged in their communities. These organizations play an essential role in mobilizing grassroots support and promoting political, economic, and legal reform and hedge against violence and injustice. Promoting healthy societies that advance participation and separates power is basic to preventing opportunistic leaders to misrule and abuse the public.

Advancement in education and protection of women rights is a great start to initiate. Education breeds independence, confidence and most importantly self reliance. Because a majority of genocides are initiated in poor, underprivileged areas of the world, a conservative effort to raise education reform will yield generational self reliance.

And because women are more effective with conflict mitigation, they are instinctive targets. Women are often brutalized, raped and mass murdered in genocide because they represent a clear destabilizing danger to the perpetrators. The presence of

women in genocide is counter-intuitive to the act of genocide and creates shame. If, removed, the slaughter can go uninterrupted without the presence of guilt or indignity. It's simply less complicated without women in the equation to commit acts of mass slaughter. And because women play such vital nurturing roles in society, the safeguard of their rights is paramount. Women create a natural counter balance to evil; their existence threatens the use of violence and any movement to exterminate life. As observed in Burundi, civic societies have flourished with "new women's associations creating employment and promoting public health and peace initiatives, and human rights organizations lobbying for a national truth and reconciliation process. These mechanisms engaged a much broader swath of society in the political and reconciliation process."^{xlvi} For the above mentioned strategy to take shape, further increased resources, international cooperation and focused attention of risk areas is critical to achievement.

Chapter IV: Military Intervention

"Had we intervened in Rwanda with a US military force, I think we could have saved half of the victims in Rwanda." Former President Bill Clinton, May 2003

If a "standby force was available in mid 1994, hundreds of thousands of people would have been saved."^{xlvi} There is no military solution to genocide, but military alternatives can be a critical part of a whole-of-government solution. Given the speed that genocide can begin, an armed force capable of quick deployment to any location should be developed and ready to respond immediately. In Rwanda, a "window of opportunity to deploy a force offering success did exist from April 7 to April 21, 1994, when the political leaders of the violence were still susceptible to international influence."^{xlvi} An U.S military presence and commitment would have changed the dynamics on the ground and placed the genocide actors in a dilemma.

While models of a conceptual force have shifted from a UN police force to a standby army, the operational challenges remain too complex for a UN force to mitigate. As noted earlier, a UN force is too often deployed without a clear enforcement mandate and unable to effectively operate. The “UN currently lacks the capability to respond rapidly in concrete ways when Chapter VI missions deteriorate into situations requiring Chapter VII actions and forces.”^{xlix} This coupled with the taxing challenges and complex environment genocide presents any military force, the U.S. military is best equipped to handle these operations.

The ideal force to respond to future genocide situation is the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps forces are “organized and equipped to meet the requirements of rapid expeditionary operations.”^l The Marine Corps flexible and self sustainable structure allows for a quick reaction force shaped to meet unique operational challenges.

The principal war fighting foundation for the Marine Corps is the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF is structured to flex and take shape to meet specific mission parameters. The MAGTF consists of four elements- command, ground, air and combat service support element. The MAGTF is a simple structure that facilitates command and control and self sustaining logistical support. And because of the inherent simplistic makeup is able “to expand and constrict force footprint in theater without sacrificing the continuity of operational capability.”^{li} Because of this unique characteristic the MAGTF is able to successfully execute missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to kinetic combat operations.

Another lesson learned after Rwanda and subsequent peace keeping operations is the need for civil response capabilities. An aptitude that performs activities to enhance the relationship between the military and host nation personnel during a crisis or in the

aftermath is vital to stabilization and reconstruction. This skill set is equally important as the military component. A unified plan with civil affairs implementation is critical to maintain rule of law.

The Marine Corps has two civil affair groups (CAG) able to detach and deploy with a standing MAGTF. The mission of the CAG is to “plan and execute civil military operations while serving as the liaison between military forces and civil authorities, the local population and non-governmental organizations.”^{lii} The CAG commander is in direct support of the MAGTF tasked to plan, coordinate and conduct civil military operations. These civil-military operations allow the military to interact and coordinate with the people of a foreign nation to provide emergency aid or assist in rebuilding a community after a crisis situation. Including a variety of tasks, they can accomplish different goals depending on the circumstances.

The civil affair group is another tool to be utilized when dealing with post crisis intervention. The CAG augment to a MAGTF significantly increases the ability of the MAGTF to address issues ranging from rule of law to economic development. Civil military operations “are an economy of force measure, one that applies limited assets to prevent or solve MAGTF problems, and which obtains benefits that outweigh the costs. By creating and successfully managing relations between the MAGTF and the wide variety of civilians on the battlefield, the MAGTF commander helps to shape his battlespace. This enables and facilitates his operations, while complicating his enemies’ operations.”^{liii}

A force capable of intervening requires “the participation of a modern, sophisticated national military- in the case of Rwanda, US participation would have been essential to lead in supplying resources and achieving mission goals.”^{liv} A MAGTF

augmented with a civil affairs group is capable of successfully intervening in crisis alike the Rwanda genocide.

Chapter V: Conclusion

Genocide is a deliberate intent to destroy an ethnic, racial, or religious group. The U.S. cannot sit by idly watching genocide unfold, as it undermines U.S. credibility and allows regional instability to flourish. The aftermath ramifications of unchecked genocide are confounding which eventually demands U.S. engagement to stabilize. The costs associated with stabilization and security operations in the wake, often exceed initial seed costs. The U.S. must start honoring a principle that many believe has lost its force in parts of the international community in recent years: genocide must not be tolerated. All U.S. national elements of power – economic, diplomatic, information and military must be brought to bear on nations and individuals intent to commit genocide.

Sovereignty and international debate concerning unilateral action will create friction and political challenges, but this must not shake our commitment to this principle. If perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention is required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices, but if unable to marshal a coalition, the U.S. must act unilaterally. As the world's superpower, the United States has a mandate to preserve and protect innocent life from brutality at the hands of mass murderers unstopped by a failing state's ineffective government. The U.S. must embrace the reality that a failure to responsibly intervene when genocide conditions surface does

not absolve it from future intervention. Rather, a failure to prevent genocide almost certainly guarantees future involvement, after millions of innocent lives are lost.

The U.S. possesses the ways to carry out genocide prevention, mitigation and intervention. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. provides the best means of achieving genocide prevention.

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- ⁱ 2006 United States National Security Strategy
 - ⁱⁱ Brent Beardsley, Canadian Military Journal, *Learning from the Rwanda Genocide 1994*, pg 44
 - ⁱⁱⁱ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, *Preventing Genocide*
 - ^{iv} Cohen, Jared, *One Hundred Days of Silence*, pg 5
 - ^v Totten & Bartrop, *The Genocide Studies Reader*, pg 317
 - ^{vi} Brent Beardsley, Canadian Military Journal, *Learning from the Rwanda Genocide 1994*, pg 42
 - ^{vii} Brent Beardsley, Canadian Military Journal, *Learning from the Rwanda Genocide 1994*, pg 45
 - ^{viii} Evans, Garth, *The Responsibility to Protect*, pg 30
 - ^{ix} Prunier, Gerard, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pg 191
 - ^x Melvern, L.R., *A People Betrayed*, pg 85
 - ^{xi} Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI article 33
 - ^{xii} Ibid, pg 20
 - ^{xiii} Connaughton, R.M, *Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance*, pg 20
 - ^{xiv} Ibid, pg 20
 - ^{xv} Totten & Bartrop, *The Genocide Studies Reader*, pg 318
 - ^{xvi} Melvern, L.R., *A People Betrayed*, pg. 60
 - ^{xvii} Prunier, Gerard, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pg.223
 - ^{xviii} Totten & Parsons, *Century of Genocide*, pg 491
 - ^{xix} United States Defense Intelligence Report, 9 May 1994
 - ^{xx} Totten & Bartrop, *The Genocide Studies Reader*, pg 287
 - ^{xxi} Ibi
 - ^{xxii} Ibid, pg 316
 - ^{xxiii} Kuperman, A. J , *Foreign Affairs*, February 2000
 - ^{xxiv} Brent Beardsley, Canadian Military Journal, *Learning from the Rwanda Genocide 1994*, pg 45
 - ^{xxv} Cohen, Jared, *One Hundred Days of Silence*, pg 97
 - ^{xxvi} Pew Research Center, Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2005
 - ^{xxvii} Prunier, Gerard, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pg 224
 - ^{xxviii} Cohen, Jared, *One Hundred Days of Silence*, 5
 - ^{xxix} Evans, Garth, *The Responsibility to Protect*, pg 81
 - ^{xxx} United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, *Preventing Genocide*,
 - ^{xxxi} Samantha Power, *Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001, p. 104
 - ^{xxxii} Ibid
 - ^{xxxiii} United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, *Preventing Genocide*
 - ^{xxxiv} Totten & Bartrop, *The Genocide Studies Reader*, pg 321
 - ^{xxxv} United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, *Preventing Genocide*
 - ^{xxxvi} Ibid
 - ^{xxxvii} Cohen, Jared, *One Hundred Days of Silence*, pg 31
 - ^{xxxviii} Ibid
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- ^{xi} Ibid
- ^{xii} Ibid, pg 32, interview between Joyce Leader and Author Cohen, via email to Washington, DC, May 11 2003
- ^{xiii} Pew Research Center, 2003 report
- ^{xiii} Fein, Helen, *Studies in Comparative Genocide*, pg 158
- ^{xiv} Ibid, pg 159
- ^{xv} Fein, Helen, *The Genocide Studies Reader*, pg 323
- ^{xvi} United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, *Preventing Genocide*
- ^{xvii} The Pearson Papers, *An Examination of Peacekeeping and the Rwanda Crisis of 1994*, pg 22
- ^{xviii} Feil, Scott, *Preventing Genocide*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, pg 16
- ^{xix} Ibid, pg 23
- ⁱ Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 3, *Expeditionary Operation*, pg 63
- ⁱⁱ Ibid, pg 73
- ⁱⁱⁱ 3rd Civil Affairs Group website mission statement at www.mfr.usmc.mil/HQ/3rdCAG/
- ⁱⁱⁱ MCDP 3-33.1 *MAGTF Civil Military Operations*
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